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Abstract
We analyse the effect of distinct levels of interest rates on the stability of the financial network under our
modelling framework. We demonstrate that banking failures are likely to emerge early on under sustained
high interest rates, and at much later stage - with higher probability - under a sustained low interest rate
scenario. Moreover, we demonstrate that those bank failures are of a different nature: high interest rates
tend to result in significantly more bankruptcies associated to credit losses whereas lack of liquidity tends to
be the primary cause of failures under lower rates.
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1. Introduction
Little is known about the long term effects in the financial system of different levels of interest rates, since
it is not feasible to conduct long term experiments with such a key monetary policy instrument. In addition,
financial markets and the economy as a whole are complex systems with a multitude of evolving and
interacting agents that do not necessarily respond to changes in rates in a mechanistic manner [1, 2]. This5
makes the development of reliable, yet simple, theoretical modelling environments particularly important
as a means to develop an understanding of the key mechanisms that can lead to financial instability.
In this paper we analyse the effect of interest rates on the stability of the financial markets under the
modelling framework developed in [3] in which endogenous systemic crashes are shown to occur due to the
evolutionary dynamics arising from copy of business models and benchmarking. Given the evolutionary10
dynamics inherent to the system, large and concentrated levels of financial failures will occur regardless of
the levels of interest rates. However, the likelihood and timing of those events will depend on such levels.
The model is underpinned by five key principles (i) the relationship between risk and returns on the
investment of an agent is always rationally maintained so that at the time of an investment, the returns
are always higher than the expected losses; (ii) the funding costs of a bank increase as a function of its15
risk profile; (iii) in order to replicate basic regulatory rules, banks cannot obtain funding above a certain
leverage threshold, and cannot operate below a determined capital ratio threshold; (iv) investors diversify
their portfolios, therefore, concentration limits on a single counter-party are required; and (v) a basic asset
and liability management strategy is used so that banks do not have maturity or interest rate mismatches.
Under this framework, we find that sustained low interest rates result in a higher likelihood of crashes20
after prolonged periods of time. The magnitude of the crashes will be of a maximum magnitude comparable
to the failures observed at higher interest rates. However, high rates result in a very quick market saturation
and a substantial proportion of failures earlier on, albeit, with a lower probability.
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2. Historical Outlook
Looking at the historical data of the US Federal Funds Interest Rates ("FED rates")[4] and the number of25
FDIC regulated institutions [5] (see Fig. 1) one can note that the FED rates reached historically high levels
before the "Loans and Savings Crisis" in 80-90s[6] and unusually low ones, nearing zero, since the beginning
of the "Subprime Crisis" which originated in 2007 [7]
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Year
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
N
u
m
b
er
of
fa
il
u
re
s
Number of Failures
Interest Rate
0
5
10
15
20
In
te
re
st
R
at
e
(%
)
Figure 1: Total number of banks that have failed in a given year versus base interest rate in U.S. where highlighted are
two periods of crisis.
The peak of the FED rates was reached in 1981 in response to inflationary pressures, whereas, a large
number of bank failures only started occurring after 1985, at a time that the FED rates had already returned30
closer to the long term trend. By 1989, when the crisis reached its summit, the time FED rates had already
dropped by a factor of two as compared to the peak reached in 1981. Since the mid-nineties, interest
rates tended to drop. At the time the "Subprime Crisis" has started, a period of historically low interest
rates was reached. Such observations suggest there is a non-trivial relationship between interest rates and
bank failures, which can be better understood using a model environment driven by fundamental market35
dynamics.
3. Model
Our analysis is underpinned by the agent-based model developed in [3], and all details can be found in
Appendix A. The model successfully reproduces crashes in financial markets by supplementing conventional
dynamics with two evolutionary elements: the Cultural Dissemination of investor strategies and Infection of40
Bank Business Strategies. Crashes occur without introducing any exogenous shocks.
The basic description of the model can be summarised in Fig. 2 where types of agents and cash flows are
indicated.
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Figure 2: This is the schematic representation of agents and cash flows in the model. All the cash supply originates in
the Investors, and are then captured by the Banks who then allocate money to loans. The remaining money goes to
market placements. Dividends and Bonuses are being paid out from the Reserves [3]. Cash flows between all the agents
can be summarised by four processes P1-P4 described in the Appendix A.
The model is based on 3 types of agents: investors, banks and borrowers. Banks act as the connecting
part between the other two agent types in a tripartite interconnected network. The investors choose which45
banks they want to invest in based on their risk appetite at a given moment. Banks can then lend that money
out in a form of loans. All the unallocated money will go to market placements, which represent the central
bank. For simplicity interbank lending is ignored. However, the potential contagion effects on defaults
arising from interbank lending and borrowing network are recognized in the model through the interbank
market losses mechanism described in Eq. (A.26) whereby losses are shared between all of the banks within50
the same rating category [8]. This is to recognise that losses are likely to be clustered within a group of banks
without the need to generate a model for a full interbank network. Finally, in the model, some of the loans
will default, thus triggering losses for banks and investors.
We emphasise that under the conventional dynamics, i.e. without any of the aspects of the evolutionary
dynamics, crashes do not emerge, in line with the principles of rational expectations [9, 10]. Crashes do55
however occur when the model supplements the conventional dynamics with the following two modifi-
cations: (1) culture dissemination in the investors’ community and (2) strategy infection among the banks
which supports arguments seminally laid out by Minsky [11] that crashes are inherent to the structure of the
system and occur endogenously without any exogenous input.
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(1) Investors performing under the benchmark, i.e. their returns are at the 40th percentile between the60
best and worst performers, can adjust their Investment Return Expectations with a fixed probability towards
the benchmark. To do that we are using a modified version of the Axelrod model of cultural dissemination
[12] and modify Return Expectations using
Rex(t) = Rex(t− 1) + a4e
b·r(t) (1)
where a and b regulate how quick the movement towards the benchmark is.
(2) Banks can change their Target Shareholder Returns and Bonus Ratio parameters by adopting those65
used by the top performing bank, if these parameters are lower. We refer to this behaviour as the infection
of the business strategy which happens with a fixed probability for every bank at any given time step and is
inspired by the process of bacterial conjugation [13].
These two modifications are sufficient to support statements by Lo [14] and Shiller [15]. Lo highlights
that individuals tend to be risk averse in the face of gains and risk seeking in the face of loses; this behaviour70
can lead to some very poor financial decisions [14]. In his book "Irrational Exuberance" Shiller refers to
contagion of investor thinking, which implies that at any given moment there could be an idea, strategy or
principle which becomes more and more popular among increasingly larger fractions of investors, leading
to bubbles and crashes. [15].
Banks experience failure when any of the following two conditions are met:75
1. Credit Failure, when the Capital Ratio =
capital
assets
< 8%
2. Liquidity failure, when the Bank Deposits = 0
4. Method
In the original paper [3] the sole input to the model was the actual US interest rate during the period
from 1973 to 2011. Here our aim is to use the same framework and replace the actual input data with80
theoretical interest rate levels so that we could build an insight into the behaviour of the model dynamics
for different levels of fixed interest rate. We study fixed interest rates r ∈ [0.01, 0.2] with steps of 0.01 for a
theoretical time span of 60 years and longer. All other parameters are the same as those used in [3]. For each
r, simulated for 60 years, the analysis is based on averaging over Ω = 1000 realisations, unless otherwise
specified. For each r over 60 years it is based over Ω = 100 realisations.85
The total number of banks at time t is N(t) and n is the number of banks that have failed over a given
period. We use superscripts tot, c, l to refer to total, credit and liquidity failures respectively.
4.1. Number of failures
We study 〈N(t)〉, the average at time t across realisations, for different interest rates.
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Figure 3: The plot shows the mean number of active banks in the system averaged over 100 runs for flat interest rates
for extended periods of time. Due to the clustering arising from the evolutionary dynamics, the banking sector reaches
crisis at any level of interest rates, albeit at different timelines.
Fig. 3 shows that for all interest rates 〈N(t)〉 initially exhibits only a weak t dependence. Gentle increase90
(decrease) for low (high) interest rates. This is followed by an abrupt drop for low interest at a characteristic
time which increases with increasing interest rate. High interest exhibits a very different behaviour over the
simulated timespan. The initial gentle increase is followed by a gradual decline of 〈N(t)〉. In Fig. 3 about
two-thirds of banks are lost in the abrupt drop. Over the same time period (60 years) only 10% of banks are
lost for low interest levels. It could be also noted that the time and rate of collapse are also increasing with95
the interest rate. This shows that under such a framework large systemic failure can only be delayed and the
speed of collapse controlled, but not completely avoided.
This long term behaviour can be explained by the fact that investors’ evolutionary dynamics are such
that the higher the interest rate, the slower the movements towards the benchmark. Equally, the lower the
interest rates, the faster are the movements. This means that the clustering of bank choices will be achieved100
faster under low interest rates. These movements also link to the propositions such as the unintentional
herding effect as explored by [16] or overconfidence according to [17, 18] because all agents do the rational
thing at any given moment, but limited choices lead to an unavoidable overlap in their decisions.
Next we consider the total number of monthly bank failures, see Fig. Fig. 4, defined as:
〈ntot(t)〉 = 1Ω
Ω∑
i=1
nci (t) + nli(t). (2)
To understand the evolution of the system in the early stages we take the timeframe of only 60 years where105
the difference between low and high interest rates is more distinct for the early onsets of failures.
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Figure 4: The plot shows the mean number of monthly bank failures averaged over 1000 runs for flat interest rates.
Low interest rate leads to a high mean number of failures at a relatively late time - for our parameters
the onset of massive failures occur after more than 27 years. High interest rates lead to a much earlier onset
of bursts in the number of failures, but at a significantly lower level of losses. These results are summarised
in Fig. 5110
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Figure 5: The plot shows the mean number of monthly bank failures averaged over 1000 runs for flat interest rates.
Colours indicate the size of the mean avalanche size.
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4.2. Liquidity vs Credit Failures
In this section we analyse the nature of micro-crashes in order to check the hypothesis that lower interest
rates result in quicker clustering of investors’ choices. Fig. 6 demonstrates that crashes vary substantially in
timing, size and shape. Credit driven failures behave differently as a class from liquidity driven failures as
is evident in Fig. 6.115
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Figure 6: The plots show the difference between credit (left) and liquidity (right) failures for fixed interest rates. There
is a clear ridge for credit failures going down from high to low and there is a clear lack of credit failures for at least 12
years for all interest rates. In contrast, liquidity failures start happening much earlier for medium sized interest rates;
also noticeable is that there are different concentrations of failures. Surprisingly for high rates there are no liquidity
failures at later times. Colours indicate the mean number of failed banks for each type of failure.
Credit failures are concentrated during a relatively brief time span, which occurs earlier for the higher
interest levels. Liquidity failures occur also in a concentrated time span but late in the simulated time
interval. For high interest levels failures are not localised in time.
We conclude that the interest level strongly influences the type of failures in the early times and that a
high interest level leads to an early burst of failures followed by prolonged period of stability. Overall, high120
interest leads to few failures over the period of 60 years.
4.3. Rate of Failures
In this section we study the rate of failures
R(i) = n
(i)(t)
N (i)(t− 1) , (3)
which measures the size of the micro-crash relative to the number of healthy banks in the previous step.
This measure is important because crises are declared when a specific fraction of banks fail over a specified125
period of time which is normally a year.
We use 〈R(i)〉 to study the relative differences between liquidity and credit failures for very high, medium
and low interest rates. We chose three scenarios where interest rates are set to 1%, 10% 20%. Figure Fig. 7
shows the mean yearly rate of failures.
7
Figure 7: Mean rate of failures on the left and representative samples of individual runs on the right. Shaded regions
represent periods of crisis where more than 2% of banks fail in a period of one year. The figures are not at the same
vertical scale so that differences between credit and liquidity failure patterns for higher interest rates could be identified.
It is clear from these plots that for low rates, the average size is high, where 8% of banks fail for low130
interest rates compared with 1% of banks for high interest rates. Liquidity failures dominate in a low interest
rate environment, compared to credit failures in high interest rate environment.
It is important to note that there are significant differences underlying each of those 3 plots. In a low
interest environment all the simulations result in very large and long lasting crises which take out the
majority of the banks and the shape of onsets of failures at each individual run is roughly the same as135
the plot for the mean rate of failures at r = 0.01. For r = 0.10 the underlying mean rate of failures is
8
completely different. The multi-peak structure appearing there is due to two or more crashes happening in
each simulation at different times as illustrated by a sample of a single run. For r = 0.2 the double large peak
structure comes from the fact that crises happen either after 15 or 24 years. For 10% and 20% rates onsets of
failures are very short and last only a year, but for low interest rates once the failures start happening, they140
last for a prolonged period of time so the cumulative number of banks that fail in a low rate environment is
much larger.
By looking at the probability of being above a given threshold Rth
P (R > Rth) =
∑Ω
i=1 θ
(
R(i) −Rth
)
Ω (4)
we can see from Fig. 8 that at early times multiple crashes happen in a high interest environment with a 30%
probability. On the other hand, low interest environment exhibiting no crashes early on, results in a certain145
crisis after about 28 years for 1% rates and progressively later for higher rates.
Figure 8: The figure shows the probability of the fraction of failures exceeding different thresholds for credit (top) and
liquidity (bottom). Leftmost plots show the distributions of any failure of a given type happening. Clear structural
differences can be seen. These plots suggest that there are a lot of small scale bankruptcies occurring due to the random
nature of the model and they start at different times for varying interest rates but never exceed higher thresholds.
Liquidity failures on the other hand preserve the same distribution of failures even for the ’crisis’ threshold of 2% and
above.
Fig. 8 also shows that credit failures never go above the 2% threshold and majority stay under 1%, which
is to be expected in a static interest rate environment where liquidity failures should dominate.
To sum up, low interest rates result in late bank failures as well as a single but very lengthy crisis and
9
high interest rates result in early bank failures as well as potentially multiple crises which last for short150
periods of time.
5. Shocks
In order to assess the effect of changing interest rates we applied a permanent shock after 100 months.
Fig. 9 shows that by increasing interest rates, it is possible to decrease the probability of failures significantly
in the long run. The opposite effect can be seen for going from high to low rates. Plots show the results for155
two thresholds of 1% and 2% of banks failing.
Figure 9: The plots show the probability of more tha1 1% (top) and 2% (bottom) of banks failing over a 12 month period
for simulations starting at rates r = 0.01 (left), r = 0.10 (centre) and r = 0.20 (right) and shock being applied after 100
months (white dashed line).
When a significant downward move occurs, it can trigger an oscillatory behaviour of crashes after 40
simulated years, but it cannot prevent failures in the short term. This is noted by the ridges at year 16 and
further scattered onsets later on with probabilities of about 30%.
If we consider what would be the best interest rate to end up with (see Fig. 10), it is clear that low rates160
are not the best option no matter where we start off. Higher rates appear to be a better option in this regard,
offering the lowest probabilities of experiencing crisis identified by more than 2% of banks failing in a year.
10
Figure 10: The plots show the probability of more than 1% (top) and 2% (bottom) of banks failing over 12 month period
for simulations where rates jump to r = 0.01 (left), r = 0.10 (centre) and r = 0.20 (right) where the shock is being
applied after 100 months (white dashed line).
Now if we look at the effect on liquidity and credit failures we can see ( Fig. 11) that as expected,
increasing rates lead to an overall larger fraction of credit failures as compared to liquidity failures. In the
case of movement from 1% to 20%, liquidity failures are almost completely avoided at the expense of a165
fractionally higher possibility of bankruptcies. However, if we compare this result with what happens with
a static 1% interest rates, we see that the overall amount of credit failures is comparable.
Lowering rates on the other hand has more dramatic effect. By lowering the rates from 20% to 1% the
early credit failure onset is prevented at the expense of increased liquidity problems.
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Figure 11: The mean number of failures for a 12 month moving window is shown. The grey dashed line indicates the
time where the interest rate shock is applied in the case of changing rates.
There is also a clear periodicity visible suggesting that the investment time tinv = 48 months has an170
effect on the exact timing of late crisis and once the first rapid onset of liquidity failures occurs it leads to a
second one soon after, accompanied by a significant number of bankruptcies.
So to sum up, increasing rates lead to a much larger amount of credit failures compared to liquidity
failures, whereas dropping the rates results in prevention of early credit failures, but results in unpredictable
behaviour at later times with a much more significant number of bankruptcies.175
6. Conclusions
Within this framework we suggest that the link between interest rate levels and banking failures is of
an indirect nature. This means that whereas failures are the result of clustering of business strategies and
investors’ returns appetite, the levels of interest rate may speed up or slow down the clustering formation.
As a result we tentatively start to address a key question in monetary policy making and macro prudential180
regulation: what are the sustainable levels of interest rates to be set and how long can they be sustainably
maintained. We suggest that such levels of interest rate should not only be a function of the economic
activity and price stability, the traditional mandate of monetary activities, but should also be dependent on
the structure of the financial sector in particular with regards to diversity of business models and investment
appetite. Governments and monetary agents always have to achieve a balance between competing priorities,185
for example, to increase the production and spending in order to stimulate growth of the wider economy but
to avoid high levels of inflation. In recent years, as a response to the financial crisis, most governments have
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adopted extreme low levels of interest rate in order to maintain economic growth. The effect of maintaining
such a policy for very long periods is unknown, since there is no equivalent parallel in modern history. Our
findings, however, suggest that there might be fundamental risks stored for the future due to such a policy.190
Having said that, we believe further detailed work is required to validate, refute or potentially clarify the
interaction between interest rates and expected - not actual - returns.
Moreover, consistent with our previous findings through analysis of actual data for banking mergers and
acquisitions, we suggest in this theoretical framework that the evolutionary dynamics of the markets will
lead to failures and crashes in the system regardless of the levels of interest rates. Within such a framework195
the choice between low and high interest rate is a choice between late or early failures, single (multiple) and
long (short) crises.
Within the framework, in general terms by raising interest rates the overall number of failures is reduced
significantly at the expense of early moderate crises. In contrast, maintaining low interest rates for very
long periods may lead to large number of failures at short time spans. Given the fact that this is the current200
situation most advanced economies find themselves in today, we believe that further work on this area is
fundamental.
Appendix A. Details of the Model
Below are the steps performed for a single period of the simulation. The notation used here differs from
the original paper [3] where we change the indices corresponding to different types of agents: Investors205
in→ i, Banks bk → b and Loans ln→ l. Once we refer to an agent or any particular type we write V ariablei
to refer to an variable corresponding to an investor i. Tranches Ti,n are denoted with two indices, the
first one indicating the type of agent and the second one the tranche number n. The list of variables used
is summarised in the Table A.1. One period of simulation is split into 4 parts P1-P4 to reflect processes
corresponding to the cash flows as per Fig. 2.210
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General
tinv Investment Period
r(t) Base Interest Rate
Spr Spread for Interbank Market
Investors
qi(t) Risk Appetite
Rexi(t) Investment Return
Expectation
Rii(t) Actual Return
m Memory (number of
periods)
AGi(t) Appetite group
Fi(t) Total Fund Held
∆Fi(t) Funds available for
investment
Ti,n Tranche of investor funds
Incvi(t) Income
Lossvi(t) Loss
Loans
LPl(t) Loan price of a loan cluster
ql(t) Relative performance
parameter
pr Prime rate
vol Volatility factor
mrk Maximum potential market
for a loan cluster
Banks
TCRb(t) Target Capital Ratio
RTb(t) Rating
Limb(t) Borrowing Limit
CBb(t) Cost of borrowing
FS(k, t) Funding Spread, identical for all banks with
RTb = k
TDb(t) Total deposits from investors
TFSb(t) Total Funding Spread
BKb(t) Benchmark Return
Cb(t) Capital
TSRb(t) Target Shareholder Returns
TBNb(t) Target Bonus Ratio
∆Lb(t) Funds Available to Lend
Tb,n(t) Tranche of Bank equity for loans
∆Lb(t) Funds available to be lent over the investment
period
Lb(t) Total Lending
IBb(t) Amount invested into the Interbank market
Incb(t) Income
Lossb(t) Loss
Lsibb(t) Interbank market loss
Borb(t) Interest on Borrowing payment
NetResb(t) Overall profit/loss
ACRb(t) Actual Capital Ratio
Cincb(t) Remuneration of Capital
TT Tranche thickness
Table A.1: List of Variables
Appendix A.1. P1: Investors-Banks
We start by computing Risk Appetite for each investor i as a standard deviation of the downside risk
over the investment period tinv which in our simulations was set to 24 months.
qi(t) =
√√√√ 1
tinv
t∑
τ=t−tinv+1
(min [Ri(τ)−Rexi(τ), 0])2 (A.1)
Investors are then ranked by qi and assigned an appetite group
AGi(t) ∈ [1, 11]
where AGi = 1 for investors with lowest qi215
Banks are ranked by TSRb and assigned rating RTb = 1 corresponding to the highest TSR
RTb(t) ∈ [1, 11]
and their rating category modified if they are below the mean TSR
RTb(t) = RTb(t) + 1 if TCRb < E[TSR]
Investors divide their funds available to invest ∆Fi(t) into equal tranches Ti,n controlled by the concen-
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tration limit CL which in our case is 10%.
∆Fi(t) = Fi(t)−
t−1∑
τ=t−(tinv−1)
∆F (τ) (A.2)
220
Ti,n =
∆Fi(t)
nti
where nti =
1
CL
(A.3)
Banks now compute their Borrowing Limits Limb in such a way that the Target Capital Ratio is preserved.
Limb(t) = Cb(t)
(
1
TCRb(t)
− 1
)
(A.4)
The cost of borrowing is set as the sum of the base interest rate and funding spread for the banks within
the same rating category k = RTb.
CBb(t) = r(t) + FS(k, t) (A.5)
Utilising the fact that there is a direct mapping between appetite groups and rating categories, we can
compute the funding spread FS(k, t) as a function of the offers from investors A(k) = {i | AGi = k} in
appetite group k and demand from the banks R(k) = {i | RTi = k} in the corresponding category. By
construction, it is bounded by investors’ expectations.
FS(k, t) = r(y − z) + w (A.6)
FS(k, t) ∈ [min(Rexi|i ∈ A(k)),max(Rexi|i ∈ A(k))] (A.7)
where the terms of this equation are defined in A.9. Here we introduce Φ(k) which checks whether offers
from investors are larger than the overall demand from the banks.225
Φ(k) =
∑
b∈R(k)
∆Limb(t)−
∑
i∈A(k)
∆Fi(t) (A.8)
Φ(k) < 0 Φ(k) > 0
r
∑
b∈R(k) ∆Limb(t)∑
i∈A(k) ∆Fi(t)
−
∑
i∈A(k) ∆Fi(t)∑
b∈R(k) ∆Limb(t)
y Rexwa(k) max [Rexi|i ∈ A(k)]
z min [Rexi|i ∈ A(k)] Rexwa(k)
w min [Rexi|i ∈ A(k)] max [Rexi|i ∈ A(k)]
(A.9)
where
∆Limb(t) = Limb(t)− TDb(t)(t− 1) (A.10)
Rexwa(k) =
∑
i∈A(k)
Rexi(t)∆Fi(t)∑
i∈A(k)
∆Fi(t)
where A(k) = {i | AGi = k} (A.11)
All the available tranches Ti,n are now shuffled and each of them is invested if Ti,n(t) < Limb(t)− TDb(t− 1)
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with probability
P =

0.8 if |RTb(t)−AGi(t)| = 0
0.2 if |RTb(t)−AGi(t)| = 1
0.1 if |RTb(t)−AGi(t)| = 2
(A.12)
Otherwise, the tranche is not invested.
The Total Funding Spread TFSb is now recomputed for each bank230
TFSb(t) =
1
TDb(t)
t∑
τ=t−(tinv−1)
FS(RTb, τ)∆TDb(τ) (A.13)
where ∆TDb(t) = TDb(t)− TDb(t− 1)
Finally, the each bank updates its Benchmark Return BKb
BKb(t) =
1
Cb(t) + TDb(t)
(
Cb(t)TSRb(t)
1− TBNb(t) + TDb(t)CBb(t)
)
− r(t) (A.14)
Appendix A.2. P2: Banks-Loans
All of the new deposits ∆TDb are then assigned as funds available to be lent
∆Lb(t) = ∆TDb(t) (A.15)
and then divided into several tranches Tb,n controlled by the thickness of the tranche TT (in our simulations235
set to 10%)
Tb,n =
∆Lb
ntb
where ntb =
1
TT
(A.16)
The pricing of a loan LPl is determined by the relative performance parameter ql of each loan cluster
l ∈ [1, 41], prime rate pr = 0.03 and volatility factor vol = 0.2 and is given by
LPl(t) = (pr + ql)(1 + vol) (A.17)
where ql is a cumulative distribution function of a log-normal distribution
ql(t) =
1
2erfc
 ln
(
5max(l)+1−lmax(l)
)
− µ(t)
√
2σ2
 (A.18)
with σ2 = 0.5 and mean of the distribution µ(t) equal to240
µ(t) = ln[r(t) + 1]c (A.19)
where c = 2.71 is a scaling parameter.
The probability of Tb,n allocation into a loan cluster as a function of the distance between benchmark
return BKb(t) and pricing of the loan cluster LPl(t) is normally distributed
p = 1
σ
√
2pi
exp
[
−12
( |BKb(t)− LPl(t)| − µ
σ
)2]
(A.20)
with µ = 0 and σ = 1, and allocation happens only if
Tb,n < mrkl − TLl(t− 1) (A.21)
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where mrkl is the maximum potential market of a selected loan cluster. If the tranche is not assigned, it is245
then put to the interbank market.
Appendix A.3. P3: Loans-Banks
When loans expire after tinv, income Incb and losses Lossb are calculated for each bank taking into
account whether tranches were lent or placed into the interbank market.
Incb(t) =
ntb∑
n=1
Tb,n(t)Rem
tinv
12 (A.22)
Lossb(t) =
ntb∑
n=1
Tb,n(t)ql(t)(1− rec) (A.23)
where the recovery level rec is set to 40% and
Rem =
{
LPl(t− tinv) + r(t− tinv) if Tb,n in Loans
Spr + r(t− tinv) if Tb,n in Interbank with Spr = 1%
(A.24)
The bankruptcy check looks at the Actual Capital Ratio ACRb defined as
ACRb(t) =
Cb(t)
Cb(t) + TDb(t)
(A.25)
If ACRb(t) < 8% bank is declared bankrupt and removed form the system, if ACRb(t) ≥ 8% but250
TDb(t) = 0 bank requires financial assistance, but keeps trading.
If the bankruptcy occurs, losses are shared between all of the banks within the same rating category RT
via the Interbank Market Losses Lsibb
Lsibb(t) =
∑
k ∈ bankrupt
δ(RTb, RTk)IBk∑
k∈banks
δ(RTb, RTk)IBk
IBb(t) (A.26)
where bankrupt is the set of banks that went bankrupt and
IBb(t) = TDb(t)− Lb(t) (A.27)
Appendix A.4. P4: Banks-Investors255
After tinv funds borrowed by banks from investors can be redeemed. For each tranche the cost for banks
Bor can be computed by
Borb(t) =
ntb∑
n=1
Tb,n(t)CBb(t− tinv) tinv12 (A.28)
Similarly, income for investors Incvi is given by
Incvi(t) =
nti∑
n=1
Ti,n(t)CBb(t− tinv) tinv12 (A.29)
and losses for investors Lossvi
Lossvi(t) =
nti∑
n=1
Ti,n(t)δ(n, bankrupt) (A.30)
17
where we are summing all of the tranches which have gone into banks that went bankrupt and have been260
lost as a result.
Before computing the net result for the bank we have to evaluate capital remuneration where Spr is the
same as in Eq. (A.24)
Cincb(t) =
Cb(t)(Spr + r(t))
12 (A.31)
The net result NetResb for the banks in each period is now given by
NetResb(t) = Nincb(t) (1− θ(Nincb)TBNb(t)) (A.32)
where Nincb(t) is given by265
Nincb(t) = Incb(t)− Lossb(t)− Cincb(t)− Lsibb(t)−Borb(t) (A.33)
and θ(x) is just the Heaviside step function
θ(x) =
{
1 if x ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(A.34)
The overall capital of the bank is then given by
Cb(t) = Cb(t− 1) +NetResb(t)(1−Div) (A.35)
where dividends distribution Div is given by
Div =
{
0.95 if NetRes > 0
0 otherwise
(A.36)
Next, investors’ wealth is updated
Fi(t) = Fi(t− 1) + (Incvi(t)− Lossvi(t)) (1−Dis) (A.37)
where distribution ratio Dis is given by270
Dis =
{
0.9 if Incvi(t) > Lossvi(t)
0 otherwise
(A.38)
Finally, all the investors are ranked by their returns ranging from the highest to the lowest. Every investor
whose returns fall below the 40th centile increase their return expectations for the next step towards this
benchmark according to the following expression
Rex(t) = Rex(t− 1) + a4e
b·r(t) (A.39)
Accordingly, every bank copies TSRb and TBNb from the top performing bank with a probability of 1%
per simulated year and this completes a single period of the simulation.275
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